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INTERPERSONAL POWER IN THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM

Kimberly Thomas*
INTRODUCTION

Instances of interpersonal power in the criminal system are black holes in our
collective discussion of the criminal law. Their effects are not visible to most
outsider observers, yet they have a significant gravitational pull within the cases
they involve and within the criminal system generally.
A few examples help to define the contours of interpersonal power.
Example 1: A loving mother has a mentally ill son. The son has, on prior
occasions, been violent with members of his family, but the mother has not
involved the police. The son has not been able to obtain what the mother believes
to be effective treatment or medication. This time, the son hits his mother in the
course of an argument. The mother, not knowing what else to do, reports the
incident to the police and the son is arrested.'
Example 2: One person "rents" his car to an acquaintance, who needs a car for
the day. In exchange, the car owner receives a small payment he intends to use to
purchase illegal narcotics. The acquaintance does not return the car on time. The
owner reports the car stolen to police.2
Example 3: A man gets into an argument with his girlfriend. The argument
might be purely verbal, or perhaps it is physical, but is not, in any sense commonly
understood by the criminal system, a significant aggression on the part of the
girlfriend. Nevertheless, the man calls the police 3 and reports a domestic assault.
These cases have at least three common features relevant for this Article. First,
the complainant has an interpersonal relationship with the alleged wrongdoer. This
relationship is, in most instances, ongoing, rather than a one-time interaction
between two people. Second, the complainant perceives himself to have a lack of
power to influence or force action on the part of the other party. This perception
may be accurate or inaccurate, but it is the complainant's determination that is

* Clinical Professor, University of Michigan Law School. © 2013, Kimberly Thomas.
1. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, No. M2006-01186-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 76, at *4-8
(Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2007) (upholding the revocation of defendant's probation after he attacked his parents
despite father's testimony that defendant talks to the television and destroys objects at random).
2. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, No. 03-99-00194-CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8953, at *3 (Tex. App. Dec. 2, 1999)
("On cross-examination, [Officer] Enlow stated that Sammy Allen, the passenger in the car with appellant, was a
known crack addict. He explained the concept of a 'crack rental'-a situation in which a crack user, low on cash,
lends his belongings (including a car) to a dealer in exchange for crack. He explained that the dealers will then
often lend the belongings to other people.").
3. The reasons for this call might include retaliation, teaching the girlfriend "a lesson," or getting the girlfriend
out of the house for a short time.
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important.4 Third, the complainant reaches out to the criminal justice system for
assistance, as opposed to taking extra-legal means or using the civil justice
system.5
The potential effects of interpersonal power are tremendous, given the composition of cases that make up the criminal justice system. Often, when the public
thinks about crime, it imagines the random street mugging or car theft by an
unknown person. However, much crime is personal, 6 involving violence, theft, or
other affront by a known person.7 Contrary to popular perception, a large
percentage of criminal offenses are perpetrated by persons who are not strangers to
the victim. 8 For example, for personal crimes of violence, more than 50 percent
involved a non-stranger. 9 These complex and ongoing relationships result in cases

4. Cf David Finkelhor, Violence: The Myth of The Stranger The Reality of The Family, in MENTAL HEALTH AND
VIOLENCE 27-28 (Eugene Aronowitz & Robert Sussman eds., 1985) (describing perceptions of power imbalance,
not actual power, and asserting this perception is significant in the context of domestic partners who abuse their
significant others).
5. This decision to involve the criminal justice system is based on an assessment of their interpersonal power
and relationship, more than any cut-and-dried obligation to report a "crime" to the police.
A likely, but not necessary, feature of these cases is an actual wrongdoing against the reporting person on the
part of the soon-to-be defendant. The first two examples involve people who have, in some tangible way, been
harmed. They both could,'if they wanted to, report their problem to the police. But there are reasons why each one
of them may or may not decide to do so. The veracity of the allegation is not necessary to the phenomenon
described. The situations I describe could just as easily apply to a false report of a criminal event as to a true
report. In both cases, the complained about conduct may be true, but does not need to be to fit within the
framework I am suggesting. The complainant is still asserting the power of the criminal justice system for the goal
of attaining personal gain, regardless of whether the allegation of wrongdoing is honest.
6. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers,and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
343, 344-58 (2007) (contrasting statistical evidence highlighting the prevalence of violent crime between
non-strangers with the general belief that violent crime is perpetuated by strangers, and that violent acts by
strangers are more deserving of the state's attention).
7. See, e.g., JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
235508, NATIONAL CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010, at 9 (2011), http://

bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv 1O.pdf (noting strangers were offenders in roughly 39% of violent victimizations); see also Hessick, supra note 6, at 344-45 (citing a variety of studies from the past thirty years concluding a
majority of violent crimes are perpetuated by non-strangers even though victims identify strangers as a greater
threat); Alice Ristroph, CriminalLaw in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571,598-99 (2011) (suggesting
"the prototypical crime in the popular imagination" is an act of violence committed by a stranger despite all
statistical evidence to the contrary).
8. See, e.g., LISA BASTIAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-151658,

NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEC. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1993, at 3 (1995), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/

content/pub/pdf/Cv93.pdf; TRUMAN, supra note 7, at 9. Different offenses are more or.less commonly committed
by non-strangers. For women, though not specifically targeted in this Article, rape is the offense most likely to be
committed by someone known to them. See Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and
Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1446 n.182 (1999) (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics report, in
1992-1993, 78% of women victims of rape knew the offender); David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the
Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1216 (1997) (explaining the Bureau of Justice
Statistics found that in 1987, only 21.2% of rapes were committed by total strangers).
9. TRUMAN, supra note 7, at 9.
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that challenge the boundaries of criminal law.'O To be sure, the artificial dichotomy
of victim and perpetrator, of offended and offender, in the criminal law has not
gone unnoticed." The creation and use of interpersonal power through the
criminal system is only one manifestation of the complex web of relationships
between parties to an alleged criminal event. Yet this particular context, and the
possible effects of this phenomenon, have not fully been considered.
Instead, cases of interpersonal power are largely invisible. Interpersonal power
dynamics are found mostly in the deluge of state court misdemeanors and
low-level felonies that make up the bulk of criminal cases. Most of these everyday
offenses produce no written opinion and no appeal. Even when they do, the
dynamics of interpersonal power would not, in most cases, make it into the court
record, save, perhaps, as pre-determined facts from the trial court. Because of this
invisibility to legislators and other policymakers, the presence of these cases has
largely gone unnoticed in discussions of how to best structure criminal procedural
and sentencing systems. Further, beyond the context of specific sub-categories of
cases, such as domestic violence in the criminal system,12 interpersonal power in
the criminal system is overlooked in the academic literature as well. As these cases
are rarely seen by scholars, the effect of these cases on the development of criminal
law has largely been ignored.
This Article identifies the workings of interpersonal power in the criminal
system and considers the effect of these cases on criminal theory and practice. By
uncovering this phenomenon, this Article hopes to spark a legal academic dialogue

10. By definition, the scope of the argument is limited; not every person reports crimes for the distribution of
interpersonal power. A number of obvious categories of cases do not fit the mold. Crimes against strangers, which
account for approximately half of violent crimes and are a significant number of property crimes, are excluded.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION INTHE UNITED STATES, 2008 STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl.27 (May 2011), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cvus08.pdf [hereinafter 2008 STATISTICAL TABLES] (detailing the number and percent distribution of
incidents, by type of crime and victim-offender relationship). Additionally, crimes witnessed and reported by
police or other unrelated "neutral" bystanders are not necessarily included; although in some cases, interpersonal
power will affect the case once it reaches the courts. Third, "victimless" crimes account for a portion of criminal
cases; in particular, narcotics offenses. While someone may report controlled substance use or distribution to
achieve a shift in interpersonal power, many of these offenses will not conform to my thesis. This Article is not
undermined by these examples, as it does not attempt to describe something common to all cases in the criminal
system.
11. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL
130 (2007) (discussing how the "sharp dichotomy between the guilty and the innocent purposely misrepresents
the world of crime").
12- See Ristroph, supra note 7. at 598-602 (relating the historical challenges of domestic violence prosecution); cf Randy Frances Kandel, Squabbling in the Shadows: What the Law Can Learnfrom the Way Divorcing
Couples Use Protective Orders as BargainingChips in Domestic Spats and Child Custody Mediation, 48 S.C. L.
REV. 441, 486-93 (1997) (presenting how interpersonal power and legal power operate in a series of family law
cases involving custody). See generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990) (discussing the "ways people who bring personal
problems to the courts think about and understand law and the ways people who work in the courts deal with their
problems" including marital problems and domestic violence).
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and inquiry that has, until now, been unspoken.
This Article has roots in my former work as a Philadelphia public defender and
in my current work as a clinical professor with students who appear in criminal and
juvenile court. As an advocate for the poor in a busy courthouse, one of a lawyer's
tasks is to discover the multiple "real" stories behind the charges and test
alternative hypotheses for what may have occurred in a given situation. I am
constantly struck by the courts' and criminal law's inability to account for the role
of interpersonal power.
Part I gives a contextual overview of features of the current criminal and civil
justice system that suggest people, and poor people in particular, might seek access
to the criminal justice system as a way to exert interpersonal power usually
associated more with the civil justice system. Among other things, these background conditions include the difficulty of accessing civil legal assistance and
social services for mental illness and substance abuse.
Part II examines the theoretical and doctrinal problems these cases pose for
criminal law. In particular, these cases fit within a literature that shows a growing
discomfort with both the inability to draw a coherent line between civil and
criminal justice systems as well as the ramifications of these new hybrid actions.
The majority of the literature on this distinction focuses on regulatory and
white-collar offenses. This Article is one of the first to highlight the blurring of
criminal and civil law in the context of "average" criminal cases.
In Part III, the Article examines the "on the ground" dilemmas, unseen by
outside observers that are created by the presence of interpersonal power in the
criminal justice system. Until interpersonal power is acknowledged, these practical
implications will not be adequately addressed. Part III also explores several possible
approaches for addressing these cases within both the criminal and civil systems.
I.

BACKGROUND CONDITIONS THAT LEAD TO THE USE OF INTERPERSONAL POWER IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

People, especially low-income people, use the criminal justice system for
systemic and individual reasons. These reasons suggest the criminal justice system
is more frequently used by low-income persons for a re-distribution of personal
power due to the absence of other viable options. While the focus of this Article is
on the structural aspect of the criminal justice system, individual reasons merit a
brief examination.
13
A. IndividualReasons

The personal motivation for reporting or assisting in the prosecution of a crime

13. This is an area in which psychologists and others, more than legal scholars, have made significant efforts to
understand behavior. This Article references a few psychology studies, but a detailed portrait of the psychology
research in this area is beyond the scope of this Article.

2013]

INTERPERSONAL POWER

may be straightforward or complex. In many instances, at least part of the calculus
is the reporting person's desire to obtain the power to influence the accused's
behavior, solicit outsiders to give the reporting person more control over the
situation, force compensation to the reporting person for their alleged loss, or in
some other way affect the ongoing interpersonal relationship between the parties.
But not all crimes are reported to the police.1 4 Even when someone is a victim of a
crime, that person makes a choice about whether or not to involve the criminal
justice system.
For any crime, a victim could have any number of reasons to report or not report
the offense. 15 The available statistics suggest, in addition to factors that apply
across the board, victims who are deciding whether or not to report an offense
make the nature of the relationship and the effect on that relationship and the
offender a part of their calculation. 16 One study showed 52.8 percent of violent
victimizations in 2002 were not reported to law enforcement. 17 The most common

14. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (2010),

availableat http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/CIUS2010download
ablefiles.zip; CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 209911, NATIONAL CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEY AND UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, HATE CRIMES
REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND POLICE 4, tbl.4 (2005), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcrvp.pdf (reporting

about 44% of hate crimes are reported to police and about 49% of other violent crimes are reported); 2008
93, 93a (reporting about 40% of property crimes and about 47% of
STATISTICAL TABLES, supra note 10, at tbls.
violent crimes are reported to police).
15. See, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S

CouRTs, at xv-xvi (1977) (hypothesizing interpersonal power and prior relationships play an enormous role in
how crimes are reported and whether they are prosecuted). Some factors believed to contribute to the decision of
whether to report a crime include: the severity of the offense, 2008 STATISTICAL TABLES, supra note 10, at tbl. 102;
see also HARLOW, supra note 14, at 5 (stating for hate crimes-in which perpetrators were more likely than

average to be strangers-offenses were reported because victims wanted to prevent further crimes, to stop the
incident and obtain help, and to perform their public duty); the perceived receptivity of law enforcement, see 2008
STATISTICAL TABLES, supra note 10, at tbl. 104 (stating about 25% of victims of sexual assault at the hands of
non-strangers declined to report sexual assault to the police because of privacy and about 6% cited police
indifference or ineffectiveness); cf Tom Lininger, Is It Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1616-18
(2008) (relaying a number of features intrinsic to the criminal justice system to explain why some sexual assaults
go unreported). For property crimes, the value of the loss may affect reporting. See 2008 STATISTICAL TABLES,
supra note 10, at tbl. 100. Victims also call the police to "catch" or punish the perpetrator. Id. at tbl. 101; see also
HARLOW, supra note 14, at 5.
16. See Ric Simmons, PrivatePlea Bargains,89 N.C. L. REv. 1125, 1127-28 (2011) (discussing why victims
choose to report some crimes while acting privately to resolve others and stating that in making "private
settlements" the private party is "essentially harnessing the power of the state and converting that state authority
into a more flexible, personalized power over the perpetrator"). The difficulty of isolating a person's motive for
reporting an alleged crime is exacerbated by bias or inaccurate self-reporting on the part of the complainant. See
2008 STATISTICAL TABLES, supra note 10, tbl. 101 (basing data on self-reported surveys).
17. MATITHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 207846, FAMILY
VIOLENCE STATISTICS: INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 26, tbl.4.5 (2005), http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf; see TRUMAN, supra note 7, at 10 (discussing violent victimizations
reported to the police); see also TIMOTHY C. HART & CALLIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL

REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 195710, REPORTING CRIME TO THE POLICE, 1992-2000, at 5 (2003),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rcp00.pdf (noting regarding victim-offender relationship, "[w]ith two
exceptions, [rape and sexual assault], there was no difference in the percentage of violence reported to the police
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reason for not reporting the
offense to the police was that the incident was a
"private/personal matter."' 8
In contrast, not every call to law enforcement is for a legitimate criminal
offense.' 9 As little as we know about why people report and prosecute-or choose
not to-legitimate crimes, even less is known about why someone might falsely
report an offense.2 °
B. Systemic Reasons
Poor people have insufficient access to the civil justice system, and they face
financial and other constraints on their access to social services--especially
treatment for substance abuse and mental health. This limited access to civil justice
remedies and social services can force individuals to look elsewhere for options to
resolve interpersonal tensions. Even for those who do not want to involve
themselves in the criminal system, the criminal justice system may be the only
viable option.
1. Access to Civil Justice
For some situations in which interpersonal property and relationship disputes
boil over, the civil law system might be better suited to resolving conflicts between
two parties and providing a remedy to the aggrieved person.
However, many poor people do not have the ability to successfully access civil
legal means of resolving these disputes. 2' The poor, whether engaged in a divorce,
child custody proceeding, eviction, or other civil case, are not constitutionally

when committed by persons known to the victims and when committed by strangers ....For every type of
violence except rape/sexual assault, a higher percentage of victimization by an intimate than by a friend/
acquaintance was reported to the police.").
18. See DUROSE ETAL., supra note 17, at 26 (finding almost 23% cited this reason for not reporting and nearly
20% did not report to the police because they had "reported to some other official"). Specifically, for the 1.4
million victims of violent crimes that occur between family members-a number that does not include boyfriends
or girlfriends-approximately one-third of those responding did not report because the event was "private/
personal matter"). Id. An additional 12% of non-reporting family violence victims indicated they did not report to
"protect the offender." Id.
19. See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the PromptComplaintRequirement, CorroborationRequirement,
and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 984-86 (2004) (addressing the
trouble with determining valid statistics on false reporting and unfounded claims in the context of rape,
particularly given the lack of empirical data). Note the FBI stopped keeping track of "unfounded" claims in its
annual Uniform Crime Report after 1997. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE

UNITED STATES 26 (1997).
20. See Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M. L. REV.
149, 163-65 (2009) (offering several reasons rooted in interpersonal power which may encourage a domestic
violence victim to provide false information or recant testimony); see also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE 9 (1985) (discussing
reasons for not reporting crimes to the police).
21. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3-7 (2004) (discussing why the civil legal needs of the poor
are largely left unmet).
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entitled to an attorney to represent their interests. 22 In addition, access to a legal aid
or a pro bono lawyer is limited. Some estimate the current legal system fails to
meet four-fifths of the civil legal needs of low-income persons.2 3 Even for
middle-income persons, a civil attorney may be out of reach. 24 Further, some
people do not seek out the civil justice system because they believe it will not be
able to help them. In one study, of those who had an identified civil legal need but
they
did not turn to the civil system, 20 percent of low-income households stated
25
costs.
the
about
concerned
were
percent
16
and
help
did not think it would
This lack of access, or perceived lack of access, is relevant. In an ongoing
relationship, unresolved issues that begin as civil matters can escalate to more
severe, and possibly criminal, problems. Additionally, due to the lack of access to
the civil system, parties will seek out other avenues. Some low and moderate
income persons with a concern having a legal dimension sought out the help of
social service providers instead. 26 The criminal system serves as another alternative. For example, an argument over personal property that might be resolved
through a civil suit could instead be brought as a criminal theft allegation. To the
extent the ci.,il system does not present a suitable means of addressing interpersonal problems, the criminal system offers an available, if not ideal, alternative.
2. Mental Health and Substance Abuse Treatment
Informal and intra-community methods of addressing interpersonal conflict are
an alternative to using the criminal legal system.2 7 A girlfriend might attempt to
have her boyfriend seek counseling for his drug or alcohol abuse. A neighbor might
ask a young man's family to persuade the young man to see a counselor or obtain
medication for the conduct resulting from his mental illness. A look at the state of
the social services network, especially for the poor, shows that attempts to access
these resources may be met with limited success.28
The treatment needs of persons with mental illness, especially the indigent, are

22. See Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 60-63 (2007); see also Lassiter v. Dep't. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 32-33
(1981) (finding petitioner was not denied due process of law when counsel was not appointed for her in a parental
status termination proceeding).
23. RHODE, supra note 21, at 3, 103; see also ALBERT H. CANTRIL, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AGENDA FOR
ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE, FINAL REPoRr ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
LEGAL NEEDS STuDY 9-10 (1996) (finding "most Americans are not seeking out the civil justice system when they
might benefit from it" and "[f]ewer than three in ten legal problems (29%) of low-income households are brought
to the justice system").
24. RHODE, supra note 21, at 3 (stating "two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals, remain
unmet").
25. CANTRIL, supra note 23, at 10.
26. Id. at 11.
27. See id.
28. A full discussion of the added real, and significant, problems of efficacy of these services and the incidence
of relapse is beyond the scope of this Article.
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unmet. For example, one federal survey on drug use and health found "[l]ess than
half.., of adults with past year [serious mental illness] received treatment for a
mental health problem" during the previous year.2 9 A significant reason for the lack
of treatment for mental illness is the cost of appropriate services.3 ° When those
living in poverty need mental health services for themselves or their families, their
options are limited. The price of private, inpatient mental health treatment is
significantly beyond their means.31 One federal study, for example, found that
among those who were not receiving treatment but perceived an unmet need, half
cited the cost of treatment as the reason.3 2
Like treatment for mental illness, there is a tremendous unmet need for
substance abuse services. According to one study, in 2000, approximately 4.7
million people needed treatment for illicit drug use, but only 16.6 percent received

29. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, THE NSDUH REPORT. REASONS FOR NOT RECEIVING TREATMENT AMONG
ADULTS wrrH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS (2003), http://www.samhsa.gov/data/nsduh/2k4mrb/ShortRptReasons.pdf
[hereinafter THE NSDUH REPORT. REASONS FOR NOT RECEIVING TREATMENT].

30. See id. at tbl.2 (reporting more than 50% of those who did not receive treatment or counseling cited cost as
the reason). While the problem of mental illness is not, of course, limited to the poor, studies do suggest mental
illness is particularly prevalent among some vulnerable populations, such as the homeless and those incarcerated.

See generally Joseph D. Bloom, "The IncarcerationRevolution ": The Abandonment of the Seriously Mentally Ill
to Our Jails and Prisons,38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 727, 728-29, 731-32 (2010) (discussing how declines in state
funding for mental health preceded the "large-scale criminalization of the mentally ill").
31. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath, Forging Links and Renewing Ties:
Applying the Principlesof Restorative and ProceduralJustice to Better Respond to Criminal Offenders with a
Mental Disorder,60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 167-69 (2012) (relaying the history of state-provided mental facilities,
including the impact of federal and state cuts on the cost of psychiatric treatment); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, No. GAO-03-397, CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE: FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD PLAY A STRONGER ROLE IN HELPING STATES REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN
PLACED SOLELY TO OBTAIN MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 2 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03397.pdf [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE]; H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons With Severe

Mental Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 483, 485 (1998); Douglas L. Leslie &
Robert Rosenheck, Shifting to Outpatient Care? Mental Health Care Use and Cost Under Private Insurance,
156 AMER. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1250, 1252 (1999) (stating the mean cost of private inpatient mental health services
has declined from $8,246 in 1993 to $5,739 in 1995 due to fewer bed days per patient). Medicaid, Medicare, and

other public programs help defray the cost of mental health care. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank et. al., Payingfor
Mental Health and SubstanceAbuse Care, 13 HEALTH AFFS. 337, 338-40 (1994) (breaking out persons funded by
Medicaid and Medicare, as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs, from those using private sources of
funding).
32. See OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMINISTRATION,
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, THE NSDUH REPORT. SERVICE UTILIZATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH

PROBLEMS AMONG ADULTS 2-3 (2006), http://www.samhsa.gov/data/2k6/MHtx/mhTX.pdf; see also THE NSDUH
REPORT. REASONS FOR NOT RECEIVING TREATMENT, supra note 29, at 2; Roland Sturm & Cathy Donald
Sherbourne, Are Barriersto Mental Health and Substance Abuse Care Still Rising?, 28 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVS.
& RES. 81, 84-85 (2001) (noting of the approximately 10% of the population perceiving a need for mental health,
more than one fourth reported problems in obtaining mental health care with the cost of care as the primary reason

given).
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treatment at a specialized facility. 33 While some are not willing to seek treatment
for themselves, approximately 381,000 people believed they needed treatment and
still were not able to access it. 34 Limited treatment options for substance abuse are
particularly acute among low-income persons, who depend on the depleted public
system to help them recover.35
3. Resort to the Criminal System

The incidence of persons who are drug-addicted or mentally ill in the criminal
courts suggests the justice system unwillingly steps into the void. For example,
about three-fourths of arrestees have alcohol or controlled substances in their
system at the time of arrest. 36 Two-thirds of jail inmates were dependant on or
abusers of alcohol or controlled substances. 37 Similarly, the prevalence of persons
with mental illness in the criminal system is astonishing.38 Drug abuse can be an
entrance into the criminal justice system, either due to an arrest for a drug
offense,39 or for an offense spurred by either the need for drug money 40 or
drug-induced behavior.4 ' In some cases, mental illness precipitates criminal

33.

OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL AND STATE ESTIMATES OF THE DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT GAP: 2000

NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE 4 (2002).

34. See id.
35. See Albert Woodward, Access to Substance Abuse Treatment and Mental Health Surveys: A Literature
Review, in HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION BY INDIVIDUALS WITH SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL DISORDERS 21, 29
(Carol L. Council ed., 2004) (stating there is a "two tiered" system-the private system for those with insurance or
ability to pay, and the public system for everyone else).
36. ZHIWEI ZHANG, NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE AND RELATED MAIrERS
AMONG ARRESTEES, tbl.3 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/adam/ADAM2003.pdf (indicating, of the cities
surveyed, the median percentage of all arrestees testing positive for alcohol or one of nine controlled substances
was 73.9%).
37. JENNIFER C. KARBERG & DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
209588, SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, ABUSE, AND TREATMENT OF JAIL INMATES, 2002, at 1 (2005), http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sdatji02.pdf; see also ZHANG, supra note 36, at tbls.9, 10 (finding the median
percentage of arrestees that were deemed to be at risk for drug dependence was 39.1%, while the median was
28.6% for alcohol dependence).
38. See, e.g., KATHLEEN R. SKOWYRA & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL FOR THE IDENTIFICATION AND TREATMENT OF

YOUTH WITH MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS IN CONTACT WITH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1 (2006) (finding about
seventy percent of youth in the juvenile justice system have one or more psychiatric disorders); ZHANG, supra
note 36, at tbl.14. For male arrestees, approximately 10% had been in mental health treatment at some point in
their life, approximately 21% had been in inpatient substance abuse treatment, approximately 27% had, at some
point, been in outpatient substance abuse treatment. The numbers for women were higher for all categories,
including mental health treatment, where the mcdian percentage was 18%. See id.
39. See SKOWYRA & COCOZZA, supra note 38, at I (finding "more than 75 percent of Louisiana's incarcerated
youth were locked up for nonviolent and drug offenses").
40. See KARBERG & JAMES, supra note 37, at 5-7 (reporting more than half of state prison inmates in 1997 used
drugs in the month before their arrest and about one-sixth committed the offense to obtain money for drugs).
41. See William D. Bales, Shanna Van Slyke & Thomas G. Blomberg, Substance Abuse Treatment in Prison
and Community Reentry: Breaking the Cycle of Drugs, Crime, Incarceration,and Recidivism?, 13 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 383, 383 (2006).
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behavior.4 2 While some people are arrested for drug offenses by police officers
who witness a drug purchase or other offense, at least some arrestees are
undoubtedly reported by family or community members who are fed up and do not
see another alternative.4 3
Likewise, the criminal system-and its jails and prisons-are left as a last resort
for guaranteed mental health treatment, however inadequate. As one example, at
least 12,700 parents in one year placed their children into the juvenile justice or
child welfare systems so their child could receive mental health care. 44
While the dearth of appropriate, affordable services is part of the problem, the
situation is even more difficult for families of persons who are unwilling to accept
treatment. Friends and families of people who need substance abuse or mental
health treatment may reach out to the criminal justice system-often as a last-ditch
effort-to achieve what they perceive to be beneficial goals for their loved one. In
the short term, the person can be immediately detained and removed from a
dangerous or volatile situation. If arrested and held (or if a family member refuses
to pay bail), a person with a substance abuse problem may detox after a few days in
jail. With our current understanding of alcoholism, we may cringe when reading
Justice Black's explanation of the "therapeutic" benefits for alcoholics of jail,
where they "are given food, clothing, and shelter until they 'sober up' and thus at
least regain their ability to keep from being run over by automobiles in the
street. ' '45 However, family members may have this exact motivation in mind when
they call the police on their loved ones.
Incarcerated defendants with mental health conditions will have corrections
officials monitoring the amount and type of their medication. This enforcement
mechanism may be appealing to loved ones of people who are not compliant with
their medication regime.4 6 As Thomas N. Faust, Executive Director of the National
Sheriff's Association, put it:

42. See DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, RETHINKING THE REVOLVING
DOOR: A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS 20 (2001) (reporting from interviews of ex-offenders with
mental illness that these ex-offenders "baldly state[d] that their mental illness ...helped drive their criminal
activity"); Marvin S. Swartz et al., Violence and Severe Mental Illness: The Effects of Substance Abuse and
Nonadherence to Medication, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 226, 226-31 (1998) (finding noncompliance with a medical
regime for mental illness combined with substance abuse were associated with violent acts).
43. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 42, at 3 (noting jails and prisons have in some cases become
"hospitals of last resort"); Bonnie J. Sultan, The Insanity of Incarcerationandthe MaddeningReentry Process:A
Callfor Change and Justicefor Males with Mental Illness in United States Prisons, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
PoL'Y 357, 357-59 (2006) (analyzing the deficiencies in mental health care in prisons).
44. CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 3 1, at 20.
45. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 538-39 (1968) (Black, J. concurring).
46. See Joyce A. Cramer & Robert Rosenheck, Compliance With Medication Regimens for Mental and
PhysicalDisorders,49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 196, 196-200 (1998) (noting range of rates of compliance in previous
data, finding mean compliance of fifty-eight percent in this data and finding at least some disparity due to
definitional issues).
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There is something fundamentally wrong when, for some families, the only
way to obtain involuntary treatment for a mentally ill family member is to have
that person arrested. But that is, in fact, regularly happening in many states.47
Moreover, if circumstances warrant it, the court or corrections facility may order
the defendant to be committed to a psychiatric unit of the jail or a mental health
facility prior to trial and disposition of the criminal case. 48
In the long term, family and friends may perceive that the criminal justice
system will require, help pay for, and enforce, if necessary, a treatment regimen. In
some circumstances, courts will pay some portion of the cost of a treatment
program for indigent criminal defendants or the cost of a program in jail or prison
will be incorporated into the cost of incarceration.49 Often, these treatment options
are not voluntary means to improve the defendant's sentencing alternatives and
outcome; they are required. The court backs up these orders with the possible
penalty of incarceration or increased incarceration if the defendant is not compliant.5"
It is not foolish to think the arrest and possible conviction of a loved one will
result in treatment for those unwilling or unable to access such services. One study
found that of those jail inmates who were determined to be dependent on drugs or
alcohol, 63 percent had, at some point, participated in a treatment program.5 1
Forty-seven percent of those determined dependent had participated in substance
abuse treatment or other program while under corrections supervision. 52
In sum, the insufficient options for civil legal services, substance abuse services,
and mental health treatment push individuals and their families to seek other
solutions. These underlying problems-and the interpersonal conflicts they createspill over into other systems. The criminal justice system then acts as a "solution"
of last resort to address these personal and interpersonal crises.
II. THEORETICAL AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTERPERSONAL POWER IN THE
CRIMINAL SYSTEM

These cases of interpersonal power do not make their way into criminal law
books. Few people consider the facts of these cases, or even review these cases,
after disposition. If these cases have dispositions, the vast majority will be guilty

47. Thomas N. Faust, Editorial, Shift the Responsibility of UntreatedMental Illness Out of the CriminalJustice
System, CORRECTIONS TODAY, 6-7 (April 2003), http://www.aca.org/publications/ctarchivespdf/april03/
editorialapril.pdf.
48. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 508 (McKinney 2011) (permitting the sheriff to commit an inmate to a
mental health institution prior to trial); STATE OF MICHIGAN, GENESEE CNTY., MENTAL HEALTH CouRT, LOCAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2010-6J (2010) (providing for the creation of a mental health court and state-imposed

mental health treatment prior to trial).
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. See KARBERG & JAMES, supra note 37, at 1.
52. Id.
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pleas,53 while some portion will result in outright dismissal.54 The few tried to a
guilty verdict will probably not be appealed. Even in the rare case that leaves a
written transcript or appellate opinion, the face of the record is unlikely to expose
the dynamic at work. Criminal cases that explore the use of interpersonal power
are not the stuff of published appellate case law. These cases are neither seen nor
understood. Yet this dynamic exists in criminal practice. In this Part, the Article
explores possible implications of these cases for criminal law.
A. On the Border Between Civil and CriminalLaw
These cases are important and overlooked examples that blur the line between
criminal and civil law. Without making a judgment about the effects on the
criminal system, the features of these interpersonal cases fall short when compared
to criminal law ideals. In fact, the tension between criminal and civil law is
particularly acute in these cases.
Conventional wisdom suggests the significant ends of the criminal law should
be the punishment of the defendant and the transmission of a moral message of
societal condemnation of the wrong-doer.55 By contrast, the correction or adjustment of an imbalance between two parties is the hallmark of the civil justice
system.5 6
Cases of interpersonal power can fit both systems. Where the allegations of the
complainant are true, or partially true,5 7 an actual harm has occurred.5 8 This harm
alleged (even if not fully realized) has been defined by the legislature as a harm
which, when inflicted in conjunction with other circumstances, would constitute a
criminal offense. 59 The harm and attendant circumstances alleged, if true, appropri53. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,

tbl.5.22.2010 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CorEMP. PROBS., 401, 405 (1958)
("[Criminal sanctions] take their character as punishment from the condemnation which precedes them and serves
as the warrant for their infliction.").
56. See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Interrelationsof CriminalLaw and Torts: 1, 43 COLUM. L. REv 753,756 (1943); see
also Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of CriminalLaw in Policing CorporateMisconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
23, 27 (1997) ("The traditional rough distinction between criminal and civil matters has been that criminal actions
are brought by the sovereign to punish and deter violations of social norms, while civil actions are brought by
private parties (or occasionally by the government in a proprietary or administrative capacity) to compensate
those who have suffered damage or to prevent harms from occurring.").
57. Set aside, for a moment, cases in which the complainant makes a false report of an offense in an attempt to
exert interpersonal power. In cases of a false report, the fit within criminal law is less clear.
58. See Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present,and Future
of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 425 (2008) ("[T]he criminal law punishes the defendant for the harm to
society that resulted from his decision to engage in the conduct that hurt the individual victim."); Aaron Xavier
Fellmeth, Challenges and Implications of a Systemic Social Effect Theory, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 695 (2006)
(including harm within the criminal system while differentiating criminal sanctions as crafted without the need to
match the individualized "harm" of the criminal act, unlike the civil counterparts).
59. Not every harm that occurs is criminal. If the harm is not so defined by the legislature, even an aggressive
police department or prosecutor could not go any further with the case. Some have suggested wrongdoing is an
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ately would be handled in the criminal system. However, to make this tidy fit, I
have deliberately chosen a specific way to define a criminal offense.
Interpersonal power cases can also fit into a civil tort framework. The aim of the
interpersonal action is to correct an imbalance of power. This is similar to a tort
suit, in which the aggrieved party seeks to be made whole again, or recover
damages, following a harm imposed by the defendant. 60 The civil plaintiff is
resolving a private affair between herself and the defendant with the possible goals
of being made whole or influencing the actions of the other party. She is not
rectifying a larger social wrong.6 1 So, for example, reconsider the acquaintances
with the "rental" car at the start of the Article.6 2 The owner of the vehicle may have
been harmed in some way by a late return of the vehicle, or damage done to the
vehicle, but believes he cannot openly disclose the "rental agreement" made.
What the owner is trying to accomplish by reporting the car stolen, however,
is the prompt return of an undamaged car, or compensation for harm. Thus
depending on what factors we deem relevant and how we define the appropriate
reaches of the civil and criminal systems, cases of interpersonal power can fit
either paradigm.
Up to this point, the distinction between criminal and civil has been discussed as
if it was clear and agreed upon. But the line between criminal and civil law has
never been clearly defined.6 3 Historically in England, wrongs were not divided
into civil and criminal. 64 In the United States, the legal system by the time of the
Constitution had developed categories of criminal and civil wrongs. 65 However,
some have stated law and practice did not clearly define or adhere to these
categories.

66

In reality, a great deal of actual conduct fails to respect doctrinal or theoretical
distinctions between criminal and civil law. As John Coffee notes, "most crimes
involving specific victims are also torts., 6 7

In implementation, each system has appropriated ideas from the other. For
additional requirement for criminalization. See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL
THEORY OF WHIT-COLLAR CRIME 39-47 (2006) (discussing wrongfulness as one of three elements of the moral
content of criminal offenses, along with harmfulness and mens rea).
60. See Hall, supra note 56, at 757-58.
61. See id.

62. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
63. See Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve CriminalLaw Objectives:
Understandingand Transcending the Criminal-CivilLaw Distinction,42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1327 (1991); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:Reflections on the DisappearingTort/Crime Distinctionin
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992).
64. See JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND FROM

THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 160-61 (1996) (mentioning, until the 12th century, the English
common law had neither a concept of crime nor any distinction for punitive-criminal prosecutions).
65. See Cheh, supra note 63, at 1325.
66. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 31 (1968).
67. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 194 n.4.
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example, tort law seeks compensation meant to make the victim whole, while
criminal law is designed primarily to punish the transgressor. But victim compensation is prominent in the criminal system. Defendants found criminally liable are
almost always ordered to pay restitution,6 8 including medical bills, or other
victim-specific compensation. The criminal trial sometimes serves a function of
allowing the victim to be "heard," even though the victim is not technically
bringing the case. 69 Most sentencing proceedings allow for the victim to give a
written or oral statement describing the crime's effect on them.7 ° In fact, the
criminal trial or plea process can function as an airing of the issue and give the
victim a forum to voice his complaint and seek to be made whole.7 '
The Supreme Court has not enunciated a meaningful distinction. The issue has
most frequently presented itself to the Court in the context of determining whether
a sanction constitutes punishment or not. 72 The Court has, on various occasions,
looked at a variety of factors, including whether the sanction is aimed at "the two
primary objectives of criminal punishment," retribution and deterrence,73 and
whether the statute contains an intent requirement. 4 In the end, however, the Court
has largely deferred to legislatures on whether a measure is civil or criminal in
nature.75

68. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.100(a)(2) (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1(a)(3) (West
2012); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 771.3(1)(e) (West 2012); see also Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, CriminalLaw,
and the Ideology of Individuality,77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969,971 (1986) ("Orders of restitution generally
are employed in the criminal process as a condition of probation.").
69. See, e.g., Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant
Allocution, and the Crime Victims'Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & PoL'y REV. 431, 449, 453 (2008) (arguing, from a
victims' rights perspective, the right to victim allocution is vital as ritual even when the statements are irrelevant
to sentencing).
70. Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 615 (2009) (pointing
out 48 states allow victim impact statements in all cases, and two states allow victim impact statements at the
judge's discretion); see also Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-65 (2004)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603 (d)-(e) (2006)) (detailing the rights of the
victim in the federal criminal system).

71. See Giannini, supra note 69, at 453-55.
72. See, e.g., Kennedy i Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (noting punitive sanctions require
application of criminal law procedures, while civil sanctions require less protective measures); George Fletcher,
The Conceptof Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32
U. CHI. L. REV.290, 292 (1965).
73. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997).
74. See, e.g., Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (listing seven possible factors for determining whether a statute is
primarily punitive, including "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter").
75. The legislative determination will be ignored "only where a party challenging the statute provides 'the
clearest proof' that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's]
intention' to deem it 'civil."' Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1980)). The Court has described this showing contrary to the legislature's stated purpose as a "heavy burden."
Id.; see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (citing Hendricks approvingly).
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B. Comparisonto "White Collar" Crime
The lines between civil and criminal have become increasingly blurred.76
Most prominently, criminal penalties have been applied to regulatory, administrative, and procedural wrongs, further contributing to the lack of distinction
between criminal and civil law.77 These offenses, typically described under
the rubric of "white collar crimes," 78 have received increased attention of both
the public and of prosecuting authorities. 79 For example, one study of securities violations found a trend towards increased criminal prosecution of these
offenses. 80
White collar criminal prosecutions and interpersonal power cases have significant differences, and they have not developed in the same way or due to the same
forces. But white collar crimes and interpersonal power cases straddle the
civil-criminal boundary, and that particular aspect of white collar crime has been
given sustained scholarly attention. 8' This Part now briefly discusses potential
ways of thinking about cases that fall on this civil-criminal boundary, and
examines the differences between the oft-discussed white collar cases and the
mostly ignored interpersonal power cases. In the end, this Part concludes scholars
seeking to clarify the divide between criminal and civil law should expand their
scope beyond these white collar crimes to develop an account that considers the
range of cases that bridge this gap.

76. See Cheh, supra note 63, at 1326-27 (discussing use of civil remedies to address criminal behavior); see
also PAMELA H. BucY, WHITE COLLAR PRACTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS 556-57 (3d ed. 2004) (noting white collar
crimes blurs the distinction between civil and criminal law); TONY G. POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME

45(1994)
77. See Lynch, supra note 56, at 36-38.
78. See GREEN, supra note 59, at 1-2 (noting the variety of possible offenses typically thought of as "white
collar crimes" and that many of these are not actually committed by high-income people). This Article uses the
term "white collar crime" as a placemarker without further definition and references a number of scholars, many

of whom do not clearly agree on the meaning of "white collar crime."
79. See Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and EmpiricalFailureof the FederalGuidelines, 58

STAN. L. REV. 85, 91 (2005) (noting 21.6% of offenses prosecuted in federal court are economic crimes, including
white collar crimes, making it the second largest category behind drug-related crimes); see also Kip Schlegel et
al., Are White Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some Evidence on the Use of Criminal Sanctions Against

Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 123-24 (2001) (summarizing prior research, including a study that
found white collar prosecutions accounted for an increase from 8% to 24% of the federal criminal prosecutions
from 1970 to 1983 and another that found little change in the criminal enforcement of environmental offenses
from 1984 to 1990).
80. Schlegel et al., supra note 79, at 131. The authors did not find support for the perception of increased
criminal liability against firms and corporations.
81. See, e.g., Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Causes of White-Collar Crime, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 949,
951-52 (1987); Susan P. Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of
White-Collar Crime, 55 AM. Soc. REV. 346, 359-61 (1990); Edwin H. Sutherland, Is "White Collar Crime"
Crime?, 10 AM. Soc. REV. 132, 136-37 (1945).
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1. Ways of Thinking about the Civil-CriminalDivide
In the area of white collar crime, the circumstances in which civil or criminal
liability should be imposed for "bad" corporate behavior are contested. 82 Part of
the debate about white collar offenses focuses on the extent to which white collar
wrongs can be deterred through criminal statutes 83 and whether criminal law is
appropriate because, at least in some instances, actions lack culpability requirements typically associated with the label of "criminal. 84
Scholars, such as Professors Mann, Cheh, and others, have offered several
hypotheses in their attempts to draw distinctions between crimes and civil
misdeeds. Some note the difference is the purpose of criminal sanctionspunishment-as compared to the purpose of civil sanctions-compensation. 85
Others argue the sanctions themselves, in particular the loss of liberty associated
with a criminal conviction, distinguish criminal law from civil. 86 The distinct
social stigma that adheres to a criminal conviction and community condemnation
implied by violation of a criminal law is yet another means of drawing the line.8 7 A
more economic approach might characterize tort law as "seek[ing] to balance
private benefits and public costs" and price these offenses, while criminal law
prohibits conduct and does not give any weight to the private benefit of the
offender.88 Other distinctions could be based on the (now often absent) mens rea
requirement in criminal law, the relative unimportance of actual harm in the
criminal law as compared to the civil law, or the use of a public prosecutor.8 9

82. See Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
PoL'Y 501,501-03 (2004) (arguing there is an inherent lack of moral clarity in white collar offenses); David Mills
& Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White CollarCrime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406-11
(2008) (using the example of private sector bribery to demonstrate how traditional "harms" may be unclear under
white collar crime statutes); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of CriminalLaw
in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 973-75 (2003) (suggesting, for several reasons, criminal
prosecution should be a last resort for remedying white collar offenses).
83. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U.
PA. L. REv. 1295, 1330 (2001) ("Criminal law has a deterrent role, but compared to well-developed administrative
law regimes it looks like a pretty crude means to encourage compliance. It is easy to see how appealing civil
options can be for deterrence."); see also John Hasnas, Foreword to CorporateCriminality: Legal, Ethical and
ManagerialImplications,44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2007) (noting the difficulty of obtaining evidence for
white collar prosecutions, because it rests with the wrongdoer, reduces the deterrent value of the possibility of
criminal sanctions).
84. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1883 (2000) (noting in trials for perjury
and other white-collar offenses it is often unclear what the defendant did was a violation of the rules, let alone
something that is clearly criminal conduct; this conduct is "far removed from the moral core of the offense").
85. See Mann, supra note 63, at 1796-97 n. 1-6. The purpose could be determined ex post by a court, or courts
could defer to legislatures' enunciation of purpose; see also Cheh, supra note 63, at 1354 (stating a tenable
distinction, albeit somewhat circular, is the purpose given by the legislature).
86. See Cheh, supra note 63, at 1349-50.
87. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 223; Cheh, supra note 63, at 1349-50 (suggesting, but rejecting, this
distinction).
88. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 194.
89. See id. at 210 (suggesting, but rejecting, these alternatives).
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Some of these distinctions lend little assistance to thinking through whether
conduct, either white collar orinterpersonal, should belong in the criminal or civil
system. These distinctions merely describe the result of choices made, but they do
not give scholars, legislatures or lawyers the tools to make choices in the first
place. Defining the line between civil and criminal based on the use of a prosecutor
or the sanction that is ultimately imposed for a violation both suffer from this
problem. 90 Deference to a legislative determination also fails for this reason. 9' If
the distinct social stigma resulting from a criminal conviction is defined merely by
the fact that it is a criminal conviction, as opposed to a civil judgment, then any
corresponding analysis may describe the results of legislative and prosecutorial
choices, but it does not provide insight into the wisdom of these choices.92
Other distinctions have a little more explanatory traction, such as the purpose of
the sanction imposed and the type of harm. Just as these distinctions have been
tested in the context of white collar cases, they can help give contours to how we
acknowledge and address cases of interpersonal power. Take the all-too-common
example of a desperate parent who calls the police to have her son arrested because
she wants to get him "help" for his mental illness or addiction. We can wonder
whether this situation fits best under a civil or criminal paradigm, where the goal of
initiating the action is not punishment. The case will, if the parent gets her way,
involve consideration of the private benefit of the offender and be forward
looking-meant to affect future behavior as opposed to merely sanction bad past
conduct.
2. Differences
The differences between white collar and interpersonal cases can help scholars
challenge facile conclusions about the civil-criminal divide, as well as better
inform how we think about interpersonal cases.9 3 Contrast a corporate fraud
scheme, in which the perpetrator is involved in insider trading or deception of
shareholders or investors,94 with the mother "getting help" for the son who
assaulted her. Some pragmatic distinctions first: white collar offenses are for the
most part prosecuted in federal court where, even there, they make up a fraction of

90. See Cheh, supra note 63, at 1352-53, 1360.
91. See id. at 1360 (noting the circularity of this distinction).
92. See id. at 1353-54.
93. Of course, white collar crimes began to be discussed as a separate category due to their distinctions from
traditional criminal offenses. As interpersonal cases fit, at least on the surface, within these traditional crimes, the
differences should be largely unsurprising.
94. Recent high-profile examples of this include Raj Rajaratnam, the hedge fund investor who was convicted
of fraud and conspiracy and sentenced to prison, and the retired head of McKinsey consulting, Rajat K. Gupta,
who was convicted of conspiracy and securities fraud. Chad Bray et al., Insider Case Lands Big Catch, WALL ST.
J. (June 15, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702303822204577468470878668722.html; Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Obtains Record $92.8 Million Penalty Against Raj Rajaratnam (Nov.
8, 2011), http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-233.htm.

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:247

the federal docket.9 5 The focus is on a small number of high profile criminal
prosecutions of alleged white collar wrongdoers.96 Cases of interpersonal power,
on the other hand, are almost exclusively prosecuted in state court because of the
nature of the offenses: common thefts, assaults, and the like. Cases of interpersonal
power in the criminal system, though impossible to quantify, are more typical than
white collar cases. They appear in greater numbers and on a more regular basis.
Another distinction is the type and amount of harm imposed. This is particularly
significant because the amount or type of harm is one means of trying to
distinguish criminal from civil cases.9 7 Violations such as those prosecuted in
white collar cases cause harm, sometimes substantial harm. 98 Yet the impact may
be spread across a large number of people, or it may not be directly perceived by
the entity harmed. 99 Other white collar crimes are described by certain commentators as victimless.' 0 0 At the least, prosecuting certain offenses, such as perjury,
02
0
enforce moral norms of the community' " without readily identifiable victims.'
A final set of distinctions between interpersonal power cases and white collar
cases is the role of the prosecutor and the role of the complainant or victim.
Prosecutors in white collar cases also have, in comparison to other cases, the

95. William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the TranssubstantiveFourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 842, 862 (2001) (noting, in 1997, approximately 16% of the federal criminal docket consisted of white-collar
cases). Federal criminal prosecutions represent only a fraction of the total criminal prosecutions nationwide.
Compare Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draftfor the Working Group on Principles to Use When Considering the
Federalizationof Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1283 (1995) (stating the number of federal criminal
prosecutions in 1992 as 47,472), with MATrHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 215646, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004, at 1 (2007),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf (citing the number of state felony convictions in 1994 as
872,200). Note, many states also have laws covering what might be seen "white collar" types of crimes, such as
identity theft; these laws give prosecuting authorities additional choices.
96. See Jamie L. Gustafson, Note, CrackingDown on White-CollarCrime: An Analysis of the Recent Trend of
Severe Sentences for CorporateOfficers, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685, 691 (2007); Wilson Meeks, Corporateand
White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal
Liability?,40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77, 88 (2006).
97. See Maurice E. Stucke, Moralityand Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV 443, 500 (2006) (discussing the
public's perception of the harm of white-collar crimes in relation to other crimes).
98. See id.; Preet Bharara, CorporationsCry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial
Pressureon Corporate Defendants,44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 59 (2007). For example, the prosecution asserted at
the trials of Enron executives Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling that the Enron corporate fraud resulted in
thousands losing their jobs and billions of investor losses. Shaheen Pasha & Jessica Seid, Lay and Skilling 'sDay
of Reckoning: Enron Ex-CEO and Founder Convicted on Fraud and Conspiracy Charges; Sentencing Slated
for September, CNNMoNEY.COM (May 25, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/25/news/newsmakers/enronverdict/.
99. Mills & Weisberg, supra note 82, at 1375-76.
100. See Kurt Eichenwald, White-CollarDefense Stance: The Criminal-lessCrime, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 3, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002 3/03/weekinreview/the-nation-white-collar-defense-stance-the-criminal-lesscrime.html.
101. GREEN, supra note 59, at 133-40.
102. Cf Mills & Weisberg, supra note 82, at 1390-94 (raising the philosophical challenges posed by statutes
criminalizing public corruption when the public official is performing routine tasks).
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03
luxury of time, in part because most cases do not involve interpersonal violence. 1
Because the alleged crimes are often administrative or regulatory in nature, the
government can take the time to assess the case and, if necessary, conduct further
investigation. In some white collar cases, due to the amorphous nature of the
105
victim,"° the prosecutor is left to piece together the case against the defendant.
This means the choice between enforcement in the civil system or the criminal
system is almost always an issue of government discretion.' 6 When the choice
exists, prosecutors, usually federal prosecutors, receive the relevant evidence and
determine whether the alleged violation should be seen as criminal. 10 7 Finally,
once the case is initiated within the criminal system, the sole decision about
whether to allow the accused to avoid criminal prosecution is usually within the
authority of the prosecutor. This person does not usually have a particular "victim"
who could vociferously object to this decision.'O°
White collar prosecutors can also choose a forum for more instrumental reasons.
For some, the relative ease of obtaining a civil judgment, as compared to also
obtaining a conviction, could come into play. The lessened procedural protections
for defendants in civil court are one significant reason to pursue punitive sanctions
through the civil, as opposed to criminal, justice system. 10 9 These include a lower
burden of proof, no right to counsel for the defendant, as well as other constitu-

103. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar Criminal Law,
43 Hous. L. REv. 591, 596 (2006) (discussing the length of time involved in the Martha Stewart case).
104. See Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes, 21 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 821 (1990); Neal Shover & Aaron S. Routhe, Environmental Crime, 32 CRIME & JUST. 321, 329
(2005) ("[U]nlike conventional white collar crimes, the 'victims' are often not only people but also wildlife
habitats or endangered species for which there is no easily ascertained economic value."); see also Mills &
Weisberg, supra note 82, at 1375-76 (criticizing the idea of the victim for certain corporate crimes as "a kind of
co-dependent capitalist decrying a relationship gone bad").
105. It would be a rare case where the citizen whose health care, in the end, been affected, will call in a health
care fraud complaint or the investor who initiates a securities fraud case has the evidence to support a criminal
suit.
106. See Bharara, supra note 98, at 56; see also Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried
Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate,5 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 321, 344-45 (2007) (noting
federal prosecutors have tremendous discretion on choice of legal theory and charge, and that courts do not
intervene with this discretion).
107. See Cheh, supra note 63, at 1328 n.19 (discussing the implications that the blending of criminal and civil
punishments might have on the organization of prosecutors' offices); Kip Schlegel et al., Are White-CollarCrimes
Overcriminalized?Some Evidence on the Use of Criminal SanctionsAgainst Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L.
REv. 117, 131-32 (2001) (examining the number of securities cases that proceeded as criminal matters); see also
About LI,

UNITED

STATFS AITORNEY'S

OFFICE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/aboutus/index.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013) (discussing the difference between
the civil and criminal divisions).
108. Of course within the criminal system, the prosecutor is not obligated to act according to a victim's wishes
and is not a representative of the alleged victim. In cases with an actual victim, the prosecutor will, however, hear
this person's complaints if he or she disagrees with the prosecutor's decision.
109. See Pamela H. Bucy, Moral Messengers: Delegating ProsecutorialPower, 59 S.M.U. L. REv. 321,
325-26(2006).
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tional protections that adhere to criminal cases."1 '
In interpersonal power cases, the complainant has much more control over the
ultimate forum for the case. If a person filed a civil suit for damages but did not
notify law enforcement, the police or state prosecutor would be unlikely to find out
about the alleged violation and initiate a separate, criminal, matter. While some
tortuous conduct against individual persons may not also be criminal, the converse
is not true. A person who believes such a wrong has been committed against her
has, assuming the ability to do so, a choice about how to classify what allegedly,
occurred."1 The complainant may make this choice informed by both her desire to
exert interpersonal power with respect to the violator and an assessment of the
other options available to accomplish this. Once the complainant in an interpersonal case involves the criminal justice system, the actors in that system will be the
ones who make decisions about the case's disposition. To be sure, police and
prosecutors have some discretion not to pursue complaints. However, this discretion can be more limited. 112
Because of their visibility, white collar prosecutors can think more methodically
about office-wide policies that take their goals for the criminal system into
account. These policies could help insure like cases are treated alike and offenders
are not over- or undercharged. Prosecutors in an overloaded state criminal system,
faced with what appears to be a case brought for interpersonal reasons, can try to
problem-solve on a case-by-case basis, but will be harder pressed to think
systematically about treatment of these offenses. 113
These differences are raised to further worry the demarcation between civil and
criminal law. An account of this divide should not only attempt to avoid circularity
and to help develop useful distinctions between civil and criminal white collar
cases. Academics have focused, because of the prominence of white collar cases,
on how and when cases should remain on the civil side; however, these discussions
hold little relevance for interpersonal cases, which are criminal cases, essentially,
as a matter of last resort. An account of the division between civil and criminal
should also seek to have explanatory value in a range of contexts, including the
diametrically different situation of interpersonal cases.

110. Id.
11. This Article uses conditional language, such as alleged, not only to recognize the important presumption
of innocence, but also to draw attention to the possibility of false claims of wrongs. A false report presents a
similar set of options as a true report.
The choice drawn here, between using the civil or criminal system, ignores the very real option of using
extra-judicial ways of addressing the wrong.
112. See Ristroph, supra note 7, at 599-600 (noting some procedural changes, including mandatory arrests,
designed to reduce prosecutorial discretion and encourage criminal prosecutions for domestic violence); see also
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (West 2011) (mandating arrest for misdemeanor domestic violence or violation of
protective order regardless of victim consent).
113. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial
Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 261, 288-93 (2011) (arguing overburdened state
prosecutors are less able to keep victims informed and ultimately determine questions of innocence).
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CONFRONTING AND ACKNOWLEDGING INTERPERSONAL POWER IN PRACTICE

A. Problems Created By InterpersonalPower Cases
The use of the criminal law system for the transfer of interpersonal power also
has ramifications on the practice of criminal law. Specifically, the use of the
criminal system to influence interpersonal power can distort criminal cases.
First, the goal of the complainant may be limited and may be achieved before
final resolution of the criminal case. For example, the reporting party may have
only intended to have the arrested person removed from the house for a few days;
but have no intention of actually pursuing a criminal case. Second, the complainant
may change his or her mind when he or she realizes the ramifications of involving
the criminal system. The reporting party may realize she does not have the
autonomy in the system to choose to "drop" a case once it has begun. Further, she
may realize the consequences to the accused of a conviction-such as loss of a job,
loss of other financial or emotional support, or a term of incarceration. Less
sanguinely, the reporting party may understand the ostracism from her family or
she will experience for pursuing her goals through the criminal
even the11retaliation
4
system.
This information may result in attempts by the reporting party to manipulate the
criminal process. The reporting party may choose to not show up in court, may
refuse to testify, or may testify but with a different version of the events that is
designed to exculpate the accused or to mitigate the prior version of events
given.' 1 5 The goal of these choices is to achieve an outcome that, in the eyes of the
reporting party, is more aligned with her desired end result. As another option, the
reporting party may state to the court or the prosecutor that she filed a false police
complaint. In other words, if the reporting party perceives the offender is in a
vulnerable position, the reporting party will attempt to achieve an individualized
justice through the means she has at her control within the criminal system. In the
example of the mother who gets her son arrested for theft of her property to "get
him help," she may cooperate with the prosecution and the courts until she sees the
outcome of the court is not aligned with her desires-for example, the son will face
significant incarceration because of prior offenses and not be eligible for community treatment. At this point, the mother, whose testimony will almost certainly be
necessary if the case were to go to trial, may choose to stop showing up in court
and returning calls from court officials. The mother may even inform her son of
this decision so he knows it is not necessary to plea bargain his case, because the
prosecutor has lost its witness.

114. See Simmons, supra note 16, at 1128 (suggesting victims may be less likely to report property crimes
conducted by family members).
115. See Rutledge, supra note 20, at 150 (describing non-cooperation as "an epidemic in domestic violence
cases") (citation omitted).
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These actions have ramifications for all parties. The reporting party may put
herself at risk within the criminal system, which may threaten or actually prosecute
her for filing a false report or perjury. 1 6 The reporting party's failure to appear for
court or otherwise cooperate with the prosecution may result in case delays. These
delays mean additional court hearings, 17 occupying time for the defendant,
attorneys, and the court. They also potentially mean prolonged incarceration for
the offender, especially if bail was set beyond the means of the offender or his
family. If this incarceration does not serve to make sure the offender will appear for
court1 18 or to protect community members, 1 9 it needlessly restricts the liberty of
the accused and serves little penological purpose. State resources are wasted by the
cost of incarcerating this person and the possibility a more dangerous or riskier
accused person could be housed instead.
These cases may result in a criminalization 120 of the accused, particularly those
with mental illness or substance abuse problems, which achieves the social stigma
of conviction but accomplishes little else.
B. Acknowledging InterpersonalPower in Practice
Considering the potential irregularities and inconsistencies created by the
presence of interpersonal power, it is paramount we acknowledge this dynamic,
and develop more systemic ways to address it. There is no easy fix. This Article
considers three possible approaches. One approach is to address some of the
underlying reasons for this phenomenon directly. While perhaps desirable, this
overarching approach is not feasible. Second, the criminal system can expand on a
variety of existing mechanisms to accommodate these cases. This approach, while
the most promising, has its own limitations. Third, some portion of these cases

116. Id. at 153-56 (discussing perjury in domestic violence cases, including the potential for frustration to
determine whether prosecutors and judges pursue criminal charges against a victim turned accused perjurer).
117. For example, in Philadelphia, the practice was often to dismiss the charges if the complainant failed to
appear two times in a row. If the complainant never intends to come to court and further pursue the case, the
second court date, and time spent incarcerated by the accused, is a waste of court and corrections resources.
118. See 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 761 (3d ed. 2004) (examining
the role of bail and bond in the criminal justice system); see alsoBell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,583 (1979) (noting
the posting of bail ensures against flight risk).
119. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 118, at § 761; see also Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150
(2006); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act of 1984, finding the
government's interest in preventing crime by those out on bail was both legitimate and compelling).
120. What results might be called overcriminalization, except that begs the question and does not comport with
the more common usage of the term. For example, Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1537 n.5
(1997), discusses overcriminalization in the context of offenses that are "morally neutral," but also recognizes the
term is used to describe "victimless" offenses or harmless morality offenses. See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008). Others, however, argue overcriminalization can
have alternative meanings. One fitting definition: "[O]vercriminalization represents the imposition of a criminal
sanction more frequently than merited given other social control responses that are available and the imposition of
punishments in a fashion disproportionate to their intended purpose." Schlegel et al., supra note 79, at 120.
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may be more appropriately dealt with within the civil system. This final approach
has seen the least academic traffic, but it also may hold out some tentative promise.
1. Addressing the Underlying Factorsthat Contribute to the use of
InterpersonalPower in the CriminalSystem
The first approach is to claim that improving access to civil justice, substance
abuse treatment, and mental health services will eliminate all "unnecessary"
interpersonal cases from within the criminal system. More options for poor people
would provide a better resolution of interpersonal matters and would likely shift
some cases from the criminal system to other institutions. These options might
include increased access to civil counsel or pro se assistance. The ability to provide
additional attorneys for low-income people is constrained by funding, as well as
current allocation of legal services priorities. 12 1 Increasing the ability of persons to
conduct their own civil cases through improved pro se materials and handbooks is
a less expensive and sometimes viable alternative. For example, many courts have
a well-established system that allows someone to get a personal protection order
without counsel. 122 These examples provide a model for other pro se assistance
that would improve poor people's access to civil court.
Ultimately, however, this is a long-term solution that requires funding, political
123
will, and a shift in our thinking about entitlement to civil legal assistance.
Further, many of the defendants in interpersonal cases are judgment proof,
meaning the remedies provided by the civil system will be insufficient to address
the goals of interpersonal cases.
An effort to increase access to substance abuse and mental health treatment
would encounter some of the same limitations, even though such programs would
provide a better result than handling interpersonal power cases within the criminal
system. One benefit is provision of these services outside of the criminal system

121. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 Lo. L.A. L. REV. 869, 891
(2009) (highlighting the absence of legal counsel for low income persons, particularly in areas concerning
survival needs which exist outside current frameworks for appointing lawyers).
122. See Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 925-26
(2010) (referencing the court-based pro se projects in Maryland). Compare Family Law Self-Help Centers,
MARYLAND JUDICIARY, available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/selfhelp.html (last accessed Nov. 23,
2012), and How to File for a Peace or Protective Order, MARYLAND JUDICIARY, (2012) http://mdcourts.gov/
courtforms/joint/ccdcdvpo001 br.pdf (last accessed Nov. 23,2012), with MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501 (West
2012). But see Gardner, supra note 22, at 71-72 (relying on statistical evidence to argue that parties seeking a
domestic violence protection order are significantly more likely to succeed, particularly when facing procedural
challenges, when represented by an attorney).
123. See Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social Change, 15
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 697, 697 (2006) (arguing for a constitutional right to legal counsel in civil cases).
But see Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (andfor Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1269-74
(2010) (arguing against constitutionally-mandated legal representation in civil cases as a "deeply conservative
and backward looking solution" which ignores tremendous costs as well as the current reforms in making courts
more accessible to pro se defendants).
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might be more cost-effective. 124 Second, availability of services at the time of
initial need-instead of a time of crisis

2

5

--could possibly avert the later-

occurring criminal conduct and the need for more intensive services. However, this
"solution" ignores the public, fiscal, and political realities that plague the solution
of improved access to civil court. 12 6 It is na've to think that merely providing
certain services would keep interpersonal power outside the criminal justice
system. Inevitably, some cases will make their way into the criminal courtroom.
2. Better Accommodating InterpersonalPower Cases within the Criminal
System
Mere awareness of interpersonal power cases in the criminal system may
encourage the courts to develop ways of incorporating interpersonal goals into the
structure of a traditional criminal case. Additionally, mechanisms that are already
commonly used within the criminal system to divert cases from the traditional plea
and trial track could be used in interpersonal power cases. ' 27 As an example, courts
will defer entry of a plea or sentencing if offenders comply with conditions of the
court. Imagine this option is available to the son who "needs help" and is arrested
at his mother's prompting. This option provides compliant offenders the chance to
avoid a conviction on their record. In a diversion, the accused might voluntarily
enter into a substance abuse program, participate in community service, pay fines,
or perform other requirements. If the tasks are completed, the case will be
dismissed. While some courts offer diversion prior to plea, the majority only
permit it after the defendant has pled guilty and waived several rights, including
124. See, e.g., Hon. Jon D. Levy, The World Is Round. Why We Must Assure Equal Access to Civil Justice, 62
ME. L. REV. 561, 581-82 (2010) (citing studies and programs from Massachusetts, Florida, and Wisconsin to
argue for enhanced civil legal aid for victims of domestic violence and juvenile criminal defendants).
125. See generally Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321,
354-57 (2002) (presenting several programs of "community prosecution" and extrajudicial treatment designed to
prevent crime before charges are filed).
126. The true financial cost of addressing these cases within the criminal system is unknown. It might be
asserted-and might be correct-that in the long run, the cost of addressing these unmet needs would be less than
the cost of involving these cases in the criminal system. Reliable comparisons, however, are not readily available.
See, e.g., Teresa W. Cams, Michael G. Hotchkin & Elaine M. Andrews, TherapeuticJustice in Alaska's Courts, 19
ALASKA L. REV. 1, 8, 18, 54 (2002) (addressing the costs of therapeutic programs, the challenges of making
long-term conclusions with short-term data, and the enduring possibility of more than a one third reduction in
costs compared to incarceration). Even if true that, in this context, an ounce of prevention might be worth a pound
of cure, the significant shift of funds from one resource to the other presents sufficient political and practical
constraints that it is unlikely to be a realistic approach.
127. See, e.g., Tiffany Cartwright, "To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle": The Recent
Development of Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 295, 305-07 (2011) (discussing
the creation of veterans' treatment courts as a diversionary program); see also SALLY T. HILLSMAN & SUSAN SADD,
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE DIVERSION OF FELONY ARRESTS: AN EXPERIMENT IN PRETRIAL INTERVENTION (1980)
(reporting on the nation's first pretrial diversion program, launched in 1967); cf Diane M. Ellis, A Decade of
Diversion: EmpiricalEvidence ThatAlternative Discipline Is Working for Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY L.J. 1221,
1221 (2003) (presenting data showing how a diversionary program has made a positive impact on one state's
regulation of attorney practice).
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the right to jury trial. In these cases, if the accused does not comply, he has already
given up the ability to contest any errors in police procedure or the charges
themselves. 128
Diversionary programs are limited in scope; typically reserved for first-time
129
offenders, youthful offenders, or offenses that are perceived to be minor.
However, there is no reason diversion programs could not be expanded or
developed to address the particular needs of interpersonal power cases. Similarly,
courts may continue the pretrial matter via a series of status conferences to
encourage a personal resolution between the parties or completion of a treatment
30

program. '
Most of these mechanisms require the agreement of the prosecuting attorney.t 3
While many prosecutors might be willing to try new applications of these devices

to help resolve interpersonal power cases, others are not aware of the extent of
interpersonal power cases within the criminal system. Prosecutors may also be
reluctant to offer a chance of dismissal to someone who is not youthful or a
first-time offender, or they may see efforts of the criminal system to address these

more complex problems as futile.
. Beyond these simple practices, there are other "alternative" approaches in
existence, such as treatment courts and restorative justice, which may help resolve interpersonal cases. 132 Drug treatment courts were instituted as part
of the nationwide "War on Drugs" in the 1980S, 13 3 and their success inspired the

128. A complete critique of these diversionary programs, especially the requirement that defendants relinquish
almost all of their important trial rights in order to access these programs is beyond the scope of this Article and
has been voiced by others. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Reimund, Is Restorative Justice on a Collision Course with the
Constitution?,3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 2-4 (2004).
129. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7411 (2012) (Michigan drug diversion statute limited to first-time
drug offenders and for "possession" and "use" offenses); see also Liesel J. Danjczek, The Mentally III
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act and Its Inappropriate Non-violent Offender Limitation,
24 J. GONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 69, 71-74 (2007) (criticizing this act for limiting mental health diversions to a
limited category of cases); Recommendations from the ABA Youth at Risk Initiative Planning Conference,
45 FAM. CT. REv. 366, 375 (2007) (recommending more diversionary programs for at risk youths such as those
in New York, Florida, and Chicago); Nancy Lucas, Note, Restitution, Rehabilitation,Prevention, and Transformation: Victim-Offender Mediationfor First-Time Non-Violent Youthful Offenders, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1365
(2001).
130. See Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeuticallyin Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV.
33, 89-90 (2000) (arguing for the use of pretrial diversion and status conferences to monitor treatment of domestic
violence offenders).
131. See Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway? Musings of a Public DefenderAbout Drug Treatment
Court Practice,26 NYU REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 57 (2000-2001) (noting the discretion of the prosecution in
drug courts in New York).
132. See Arthur J. Lurigio et al., The Effects of Serious Mental Illness on Offender Reentry, 68 FED. PROBATION
45, 50 (2004) (citing the need for more alternatives to incarceration for the mentally ill).
133. LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of
TherapeuticJusticefor Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 280-81 (2001).
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creation of homelessness courts, 13 4 family-centered courts, 13 5 and others. More
136
than 2,000 drug courts alone are currently in operation or being planned.
At their best, these courts recognize the complexity of cases that involve
substance abuse, family relationships, homelessness, and other non-criminal
factors that lead or contribute to criminal offenses. 137 At their worst, these courts
purport to adopt an alternative model but refuse to acknowledge the ongoing
nature of substance abuse or mental illness.138 Some iterations of these courts
punish defendants for relapses that are expected by those treating substance abuse,
for example. 139 These courts can also be conviction-focused, mandating a guilty
plea and waiver of trial rights as condition for treatment. 140 This is a heartbreaking
Catch-22 for some defendants and their families desperate for services. Finally,
one structural limitation is the inability of these courts to require participation on
the part of the reporting party. 14 1 This structural limitation can be contrasted with
142
the parties in civil court, who can be compelled to submit to case evaluation,
mediation, 14 3 or other alternative avenues of settlement.
Restorative justice also attempts to acknowledge the complexity of criminal
cases and the relationships between parties to a criminal case. 144 Restorative
justice holds appeal for those concerned about interpersonal cases because, in
addition to acknowledging the dynamics, it attempts to develop alternative and

134. Id. at 283, 301.
135. John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implicationsfor Justice Change, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 923, 923 (2000).
136. History: Justice Professionals Pursue a Vision, NAT'L Assoc. OF DRUG COURT PROF'LS., http://www.
nadcp.org/leam/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
137. See Adam Lamparello, Note, ReachingAcross Legal Boundaries: How Mediation Can Help the Criminal
Law in Adjudicating "Crimes ofAddiction", 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 335, 347 (2001) (advocating for drug
courts and mediation for "crimes of addiction").
138. See Quinn, supra note 131, at 60.
139. Id. at49.
140. Id. at 54-56.
141. This limitation can be mitigated in some juvenile court cases, where the court can order parents to
participate in treatment services. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.134 (2012) (empowering a juvenile court to
mandate parental participation in counseling or institutional treatment).
142. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman & Christopher M. Fairman, Interplay Between Mediation and Offer of
Judgment Rule Sanctions, 26 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 327, 347-52 (2011) (outlining the Michigan rules on
judicially-mandated case evaluation).
143. See, e.g., Robert K. Wise, Mediation in Texas: Can the Judge Really Make Me Do That?, 47 S. TEx. L.
REV. 849, 853-55 (2006) (stating Texas law permits judges to refer any civil case to mediation, regardless of
whether any party consents and regardless of whether a party has moved to refer the matter for alternative dispute
resolution).
144. See, e.g., Zvi D. Gabbay, Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm:Restorative Justice
and White-Collar Crime, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 421, 424 (2007) ("Restorative justice is a process
involving the direct stakeholders in determining how best to repair the harm done by offending behavior.")
(internal citation omitted); see also Jim Dignan, Restorative Justice and the Law: the Case for an Integrated,
Systemic Approach, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW 168, 171-75 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002) (noting the

difficulty of developing one definition of restorative justice that can be agreed upon; contrasting those who see is
as a "type of decision-making process" from those who place more emphasis on "restorative outcomes").
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longer-term solutions45that address the relationship, behavior or emotions underlying the criminal act.'
On the other hand, restorative justice can be limited by its principal focus on the
rights and interests of the victims of criminal cases.1 46 Typically, the offender's
involvement is gauged or discussed only in relationship to the role of the victim in
her search for justice, closure, understanding, or other goals. 147 Restorative justice
initiatives can become absorbed in victims' rights and the attendant concerns that
149
48
criminal victims' voices be heard1 or that victims' autonomy be recognized.
Those restorative justice scholars who focus on both the offender and the victim
are careful to distinguish themselves from this general rule and defend their choice
to make the offender part of their concern. 1 50 A focus on victims, without the

related focus on offenders, undermines the strength of restorative justice for
interpersonal cases-an understanding of the interrelated nature of the parties and
the ongoing circumstances. For example, to the extent restorative justice initiatives
have supported victims' rights more generally, they may develop a more punitive

145. See GEORGE PAVLICH, GOVERNING PARADOXES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 2 (2005) (describing variety of
practices encompassed in restorative justice but noting the commonality is a rejection of adversarial retribution
and an embrace of "nuanced concepts of harm,obligation, need, restoration, healing, reconciliation, reintegration,
participation and-when appropriate-forgiveness"); see also Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman,
Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 22-25, 28-30 (2003) (noting most

victims seek more than merely enhanced punishment from the criminal justice system, making restorative justice
an ideal fit).
146. See PAVLICH, supra note 145, at 2 (stating restorative justice involves a "community-based, victimcentered approach[] to crime"); John Braithwaite, In Search of Restorative Jurisprudence, in RESTORATIVE

JUSTICE AND THE LAW 150, 160 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002) (noting the difficulty that "equal justice for victims is
incompatible with equal justice for offenders"); Barbara Hudson, Victims and Offenders, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 177, 186 (Andrew Von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003)

(noting restorative justice "individualises cases more than established justice does and so allows for greater
variation between cases, [but] solves the problem of equilibrium in the single case in the same way that
established criminal justice does, by coming down clearly on one side-that of the victim .. ").But see Leena
Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235, 263, 266-68 (2000)
(emphasizing that restorative justice is not just part of the victims' rights movement, but seeks to benefit both
victims and offenders). An additional limitation is, in general, restorative justice is assumed to occur within the
current criminal justice system. See Lode Walgrave, Investigating the Potentials of RestorativeJustice Practice,
36 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 91, 95-96 (2011) (presenting an argument against the majoitarian process-based
approach to restorative justice); PAVLICH, supra note 145, at 18-20 (noting while restorative justice's roots are
incompatible with the criminal system, there is a strong strain that also view it as "an alternative to specific
processes provided within that system" instead of a critique of the entire system).
147. See generally R. A. Duff, RestorativePunishment and Punitive Restoration,in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND

THE LAW 82, 93 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002) (noting the offender should recognize his culpability and warning that
"it is all too easy for censure and blame to become exercises in oppression, humiliation or exclusion").
148. See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of CriminalProcess: The Victim ParticipationModel, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 289, 293-98 (arguing for greater victim participation throughout criminal cases while acknowledging that "victim participation may or may not conflict with the value of the primacy of the individual defendant").
149. See id. at 296-97.
150. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 146, at 186-87 (explaining, "[t]hough it may seem obvious that a victim's
right to safety must have priority over an offender's right to privacy or to freedom of movement, the scales should
not be weighted so that the one is everything and the other is nothing").
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stance towards defendants.15 1 However, in interpersonal cases, the desires of the
victim are not necessarily punitive for a variety of reasons. 152 While restorative
justice may help us understand interpersonal cases, it does not provide a panacea.
3. Moving InterpersonalCases into the Civil System
It may be possible to move select interpersonal criminal cases into the civil
system or use approaches from the civil system. This approach acknowledges the
153
dual nature of these cases, but keeps the criminal and civil systems distinct.
There are few models to emulate for moving cases from the criminal to civil
system. One potential example, derived from restorative justice ideals, is the use of
victim-offender mediation in criminal cases. In victim-offender mediation, the
complainant and the accused are brought together by a trained mediator, to discuss
the offense and the effect of the offense, and develop a plan to address the harm
done. 154 While this idea has been around for at least twenty-five years, 155 it is
primarily used in juvenile court and for non-violent offenses. 156 When it has been
used in more serious offenses, mediation prior to trial may deprive the defendant of
legitimate procedural or substantive defenses, while mediation that occurs after
conviction may negate the wishes of the complainant who does not want to

151. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Commentary, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 579, 590-92 (1998) (discussing how victims' rights groups highlight the anger of
victims to advocate primarily for harsher criminal punishments). But see Kent Roach, Criminology: FourModels
of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671, 700-13 (1999) (presenting punitive and
non-punitive models of victims' rights).
152. As many have discussed, the desire of the victim not to aggressively pursue a criminal case against a
defendant may be based in the victim's previous physical or mental abuse at the hands of the accused. See, e.g.,
Rutledge, supra note 20, at 174-75 (observing the threat of continued domestic violence is the most common
justification for victims who decide to stop cooperating with a criminal prosecution); see also Braithwaite, supra
note 146, at 150-51 (noting courts, in particular in New Zealand and Canada have tended to overturn restorative
justice agreements in favor of more punitive sanctions); id. at 161 (noting there is an "empirically wrong ....
presumption... that victims will demand more punishment than the courts deem proportionate, whereas in fact
the 'problem' is that they more often demand less than the courts deem proportionate").
153. See Mann, supra note 63, at 1863, 1865 (endorsing the growing use of punitive civil sanctions for
situations which do not merit the serious condemnation of criminal punishment).
154. William R. Nugent, Mona Williams & Mark S. Umbreit, Participationin Victim-Offender Mediation and
the Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137,
137-38; Mark S. Umbreit, Robert B. Coates & Betty Vos, The Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation: Two
Decades ofResearch, 65 FED. PROBATION 29, 29 (2001).
155. See ROBERT C. DAvis, MARTHA TICHANE & DEBORAH GRAYSON, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION AS ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION IN FELONY ARREST CASES (1980) (evaluating an early mediation

program), available at http://www.vera.rg/content/mediation-and-arbitration-altematives-prosecution-felonyarrest-cases.
156. See, e.g., Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-ManagementCriminal Mediation, 40 IDAHO L. REv. 571,
584-85 (2004) (pointing out, for violent crimes, crimes committed by adults, and felonies, victim-offender
mediation is uncommon).
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criminalize the conduct of the offender. 157 In at least some interpersonal cases,
however, the parties could be voluntarily brought together with a mediator and a
plan could, at least in some cases, be developed to address the concerns of the
complainant that caused her to involve the criminal system.
Another possibility is to look, again, to the treatment of white-collar offenses.' 5 8
Could there be a choice in interpersonal cases to pursue them in-or divert them
to-the civil system instead of the criminal system? In many white-collar cases,
the ability to move cases between criminal and civil is eased because the initial
59
investigation and enforcement of violations are pursued by the same agency. 1
This agency, therefore, has some voice in the method of enforcement. Further,
even if a parallel criminal enforcement is started, the agency may choose to
negotiate for a remedy that results in civil liability, but no criminal liability.1 60 The
government can, in exchange for moving the case into civil court, demand a
remedy that includes significant financial compensation or penalties in a whitecollar case. 16 ' This is a hollow option in an interpersonal power scenario.
The practical constraints of moving everyday criminal cases into the civil
system are significant. Courts would have to address the jurisdiction of prosecuting
authorities and who would pursue the case on behalf of the plaintiff; the possibility
of the waiver of a defendant's right to a speedy trial; and the finality of a civil
162
resolution. Current law suggests double jeopardy concerns could be overcome
and Fifth Amendment protection would also need to be addressed. While more
study is necessary, the transfer of some interpersonal criminal cases into civil court
is worth considering.
CONCLUSION: COMING TO TERMS WITH INTERPERSONAL POWER IN THE
CRIMINAL SYSTEM

Cases of interpersonal power quietly populate the criminal justice system. These
cases, which are brought to the criminal system by a person with an ongoing

157. Cf

Mark

S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice: An Empirically Grounded Movement Facing Many

Opportunities and Pitfalls, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 511,560 (2006) (recommending either party have the
ability to go forward with the formal court system if restorative justice measures are not satisfactory).
158. Cf Braithwaite supra note 146, at 153 (noting there is no necessary disparity in restorative justice
between showing mercy for corporate criminals, such as agreements for safety or compliance regimes in lieu of
criminal prosecution, and for street criminals).
159. See Andrea L. Ciota et al. Ninth Survey of White Collar Crime: Securities Fraud, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
827, 868-72 (1994) (outlining the use of investigative and litigative powers by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, including the use of parallel lawsuits and referral for criminal prosecution).
160. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477,

1525 (1996).
161. See Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-SOX
Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 91-93 (2007).
162. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) (finding no double jeopardy violation when
defendant was criminally prosecuted and subject to in rem civil forfeiture because the forfeiture action was a
separate remedial sanction, not punishment, for double jeopardy purposes).
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relationship with the defendant in an effort to exert interpersonal power on the
defendant, have largely gone under the scholarly radar.
These cases are handled in criminal courtrooms, in part because of the lack of
access to civil legal services, and sufficient treatment options, especially for
lower-income persons. Faced with a familial problem that is spiraling out of
control, the criminal justice system can serve as a lifeline.
Interpersonal cases, however, do not neatly fit into our understanding of
criminal law or our practice of criminal law. For one, these cases press upon the
distinction between civil and criminal law in ways that are different from the more
common topic of scholarly discussion-white-collar crime. A full accounting of
this divide must also include cases of interpersonal power.
This Article seeks to introduce these cases to an academic audience and
integrate them into the scholarly debate about the lines demarcating criminal law,
as well as begin an admittedly challenging discussion of ways to better address
interpersonal cases in the day-to-day of criminal courts. The dialogue on the
theoretical and practical ramifications of interpersonal cases in the criminal system
will, hopefully, continue from here. The prevalence and significance of these cases
demand that it should.

